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Abstract 
 
Climate justice requires sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its 
resolution equitably and fairly.  It brings together justice between generations and justice 
within generations.  In particular it requires that attempts to address injustice between 
generations through curbing greenhouse gas emissions do not end up creating injustice in 
our time by hurting the presently poor and vulnerable.  This essay considers the 
transformative power of education in its many dimensions as one entry point into 
expanding the scope of policy instruments for climate justice.  First, education can change 
behavior, primarily in rich countries but also in poor countries, and thus help mitigate 
climate injustice between the generations.  Second, resources targeted to the education of 
the poorest in poor countries can help their development but also help to counter some of 
the negative spillover effects of interventions to mitigate climate change.  Hence the title of 
this essay — Education for Climate Justice.  
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1. Introduction 
The Stern Review famously stated that climate change is the biggest market failure 
the world has ever seen (Stern, 2006).  The Review was referring to the inability of market 
mechanisms to adequately price in the future societal costs of present economic activity. 
Markets are also not known for necessarily achieving social and distributional justice 
objectives by themselves (Stiglitz, 2012).  The combination of market failure and 
distributional failure is fundamental to the climate change discourse and to the dialogue on 
climate justice, which contributes to sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and 
its resolution equitably and fairly.  
 
Two dimensions of justice need to be borne in mind in the discussion of climate 
change.  The first if of course justice between the generations, ensuring that the present 
generation carries forth its stewardship role in what it bequeaths to the unborn generations 
to come.  The second dimension, however, is justice within the generations, in particular 
justice within our own generation – justice in our time.  It is easy to equate justice between 
the generations with addressing failures in markets that are meant to stretch across time, in 
other words pricing of present economic activity to take into account its impact on future 
generations.  Indeed, little distinction seems to be made between these two in the climate 
change discourse.  However, justice in our time is a separate, albeit related, issue which 
needs to be assessed and addressed on its own terms.  Particular attention needs to be paid 
to the use of policy instruments which, while addressing intergenerational justice, may 
heighten intra-generational injustice. 
 
This paper argues that education plays and will play a key role in addressing the 
twin dimensions of climate justice, between and within generations.  The failures of 
markets to price costs and benefits appropriately over time, and the intergenerational justice 
to which the failure can give rise, can be mitigated to a significant extent by educating 
present generations about the future costs of their actions so that they will themselves 
factor in these costs in their decisions and thus give markets the right signals on pricing. 
Recent development in behavioral economics establish the scientific foundations of the 
claim and also give guidance on how education combined with policy can contribute to a 
more environmentally aware population.  
 
Justice in our time, and especially guarding the interests of the presently vulnerable 
so that interventions to safeguard the future against climate change do not come at their 
expense, also turns out to require education in at least two senses.  First, to the extent that 
assistance for compensation is necessary then assistance to the vulnerable in the form of 
educational investment has high priority in its own terms.  Second, global education to 
heighten awareness of ethical issues in climate change, especially for citizens of wealthy 
countries, can lay the foundations for protecting today’s vulnerable populations as well as 
building a constituency for climate change interventions.  Thus we can harness the 
transformative power of education for climate stewardship. 
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The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 elaborates on the intersection of 
market failure and distributional failure in the climate change discourse, as a prelude to 
developing arguments for the transformational role of education in climate justice.    
Section 3 takes up the role of education in mitigating market failure in weighing up costs 
and benefits across the generations, especially in light of recent Nobel Prize winning 
contributions to behavioral economics.  Section 4 turns the spotlight on the implications of 
climate change interventions for justice within our own generation and the many senses in 
which education can play a role in addressing this dimension of climate justice.  Section 5 
concludes by emphasizing the policy implications of the arguments presented in this paper. 
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2.  Market Failure, Distributional Failure and Climate Justice  
  
What exactly are “market failure” and “distributional failure”, and why do they 
matter to climate justice?  Answers to these questions are important to provide the bearings 
which locate the role of education in climate justice. 
 
 When a market works well it balances out supply and demand, and establishes a 
price that serves as a marker of the scarcity of the commodity being traded on that market. 
When the scarcity signals work well relative to each other, they induce shifts in supply 
towards commodities which are scarce, and shifts in demand away from these 
commodities.  If the system of markets and prices works as it is meant to in economics text 
books, then it will achieve an outcome that is economically efficient.  In common language, 
it will lead to total economic wellbeing as large as possible given the overall resources of 
the economy. 
 
 Some markets do approximate to well-functioning text book markets, and it would 
be foolish to disregard the basic economics of such markets.  As policy makers over the 
years have discovered, undue interference in some markets, albeit well meaning, can have 
major unintended consequences, like the creation of parallel black markets in foreign 
exchange which were a familiar feature of many low income countries until the 
liberalization waves of the late twentieth century. 
 
 However, many, perhaps most, markets do not function well, in the sense that their 
operation leads to prices which do not signal appropriate social scarcity.  Indeed, there may 
be a perverse effect where the market underprices precisely those commodities which are 
socially most scarce.  These are commodities, in particular, whose consumption cannot be 
parceled out and priced individual by individual, a key requirement for the role of prices in 
signaling scarcity (for a standard text book treatment of these issues see Cornes and 
Sandler, 1996).  Furthermore, markets do not come into being spontaneously.  Some 
market maker has to find it profitable enough to create the market in question.  This may 
not be the case for some commodities so those markets may simply not exist and thus price 
signals for those commodities will not exist. 
 
 It matters a lot, then, which market we are talking about.  Dockside markets for fish 
brought in by fishermen that day may well come close to the text book model, and indeed 
that was the example used by Alfred Marshall, one of the founders of the modern discipline 
of economics, in the nineteenth century (Marshall, 2014).  However, markets for goods to 
be delivered in the distant future, or markets for goods whose consumption cannot be 
individualized, or goods whose production and consumption has significant spillover 
effects on others which are unmediated by markets, are a different matter. 
 
 Interestingly, before turning to climate change and in preparation for the discussion 
in later sections, it can be noted that education is indeed such a commodity.  Investment in 
education for an individual, or for that individual’s family, comes today but the return will 
be reaped in an uncertain future.  While it can plausibly be argued that education can be 
parcelized and monitored as investment in a specific individual, the social returns to 
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education go beyond the return to an individual and depend moreover on the education 
embodied in others.  It is in this sense that markets for education cannot fully signal the 
true social value of education at the individual level, and hence the case for public 
intervention in this sector. 
 
Climate change also involves precisely such commodities as make the operation of 
markets inefficient or non-existent.  A greenhouse gas polluter is in effect consuming clean 
air, which cannot very easily be marketized into bundles to be bought and sold.  Further, 
the consequences of greenhouse gas pollution, going well beyond straightforward reduction 
of clean air in the future to temperature change and its repercussions, will be borne by 
generations yet unborn.  Clearly, a market where they can express their demand for clean 
air to today’s consumers of clean air (in other words, today’s polluters) simply cannot exist. 
And when such a market does not exist, there is not a price which can signal scarcity value 
and overconsumption of clean air, and the environment more generally, will continue 
apace.  
 
This is the market failure which the Stern Review spoke of.  It leads, in simple 
economic logic, to inefficiency in the economy seen as stretching across the generations—
both generations could be made better off if this market failure could be fixed.  Of course, 
the outcome can also be indicted on grounds of intergenerational justice.  Future 
generations, having no economic clout in today’s markets, nor political voice in today’s 
policy decisions, are forced to bear the costs of this generation’s overconsumption as the 
result of underpricing of environmental goods.  An alternative perspective, for example one 
based on the moral imperative of stewardship of resources by each generation, would likely 
come to the same conclusion.  An interesting case, perhaps, of two seemingly opposed 
perspectives, the economic and the moral, coming together in the case of climate justice. 
 
But justice cannot simply be confined to justice between the generations; it also has 
to be addressed and advanced within generations—within future generations of course but 
particularly within the present generation.  One way to think about distributional justice 
within a generation in the context of a market economy is to use the simple statement that 
income can be seen as the value of an asset times the return on that asset.  Thus capital 
income is the value of capital owned by an individual times the rate of return on the capital. 
Labor income is the amount of human capital embodied in an individual times the wage 
accruing to labor of that skill level.  And similarly for other assets such as land, and of 
course physical and human capital can be divided up into many constituent parts of assets 
of different types.  The basic point is that final inequality is composed of the inequality of 
assets across individuals and the inequality of rates of return to these assets.  Market 
processes determine the rates of return which, given the historically inherited asset 
inequalities, generate inequalities of outcome, which in turn lead to the next round of asset 
inequalities and so on into the future.  Note that education once again plays a key role, this 
time in distributional equity, because of its central role in determining the inequality of 
human capital. 
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 Addressing the biggest market failure the world has ever known, achieving justice 
between generations, and at the same time not compromising the wellbeing of the poor and 
vulnerable of the present generation, is a tall order indeed.  It is a basic precept of policy 
economics that the number and type of policy instruments has to match the number and 
type of social objectives.i  Otherwise some social objective or the other will have to give 
way, the only question being which one.  An analogy would be trying to fit a room with too 
small a carpet.  Whichever side of the room one starts with, in the end one part of the room 
will be left wanting.  The only answer is to either make do with part of the room 
uncarpeted, or to get a bigger carpet.  Translating back to the policy world, the only answer 
is to either let go of some objectives, or to search for new policy instruments.  The 
following sections will argue that education provides one such class of policy instruments 
which, in its many manifestations, can help in the simultaneous achievement of the 
ambitious goal of climate justice, sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its 
resolution equitably and fairly. 
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3.  Education and Market Failure 
 
 The classical approach in economics to mitigating market failure is to introduce 
corrective taxes or subsidies which change the price in the market in question to better 
reflect social scarcity.  The simplest and best known example is when the output of a 
polluter, who is using up clean air or clean water without paying for it, is taxed to account 
for the full social costs of the inputs being used (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).ii  Similarly, if 
a commodity or an activity with social benefit is priced too low, then a price subsidy would 
be called for.  As argued in the last section, the market for education has features which 
tend to undervalue the social benefit of private investment, and thus a subsidy of some 
form may be in order. 
 
 Taking up then “the biggest market failure the world has ever seen”, through the 
inability of markets to appropriately price in the future costs of current emissions of 
greenhouse gases, and thus of the economic activity which leads to it, it follows that the 
correct response is to tax these emissions, and to subsidize activities which do not lead to 
these emissions.  Leaving to one side much technical detail and nuance, in principle if we 
could find enough tax and subsidy instruments, including subsidizing research and 
development for clean energy, we could “solve” the market failure problem of climate 
change.  In doing so, we would also in principle address the problem of justice between the 
generations, since their inability to influence current prices would be corrected for through 
the tax-subsidy instruments.  Of course, to the extent that the instruments available were 
limited, the problem could only be addressed partially. 
 
 The central problem faced by policy makers in translating the prescription of basic 
economics for correcting market failure is indeed the limited set of instruments at their 
disposal.  A carbon tax, for example, will have knock on effects on the economy some of 
which may be undesirable and which may need to be fixed through other tax-subsidy 
instruments, which may in turn not be simple or straightforward to implement.  A carbon 
tax will also have distributional impacts, which will be taken up more fully in the next 
section, and the instruments needed to address and redress these repercussions may be 
technically or politically infeasible. 
 
 The more instruments there are, the easier is the policy makers’ task in mitigating 
the market failure of climate change.  Consider then the following line of argument which 
points to a class of instruments which are not given as much prominence in the climate 
change discourse as they should.  The argument turns on questioning the text book 
economics model of the basis on which individuals make their production and consumption 
decisions.  This assumes, for example, that individuals base their market decisions after full 
reflection on the consequences.  Further, it assumes that they take into account the 
consequences only for themselves and not for others or, even if they do, the collective good 
of society as a whole is no part of their calculus.  These assumptions have been questioned 
by the branch of economics known as behavioral economics, and its findings have strong 
implications for policy responses to climate change. 
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 The award of the Nobel Prize in economics to the psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
recognized an ongoing revolution in economics.  Under the broad heading of behavioral 
economics, insights from the psychology of human behavior are being incorporated into 
models of market behavior.  Alongside the Nobel Prize to Kahneman, other signs of a shift 
in thinking are the award of the Clark Medal to Matthew Rabin, and the Mac Arthur 
“genius” award to Sendhil Mullainathan.iii  Behavioral economics is a broad and deep 
tectonic movement in the way economic behavior of individuals, and thus the interpretation 
of price outcomes in markets, are conceptualized and quantified (Kahneman (2011); 
Camerer, Lowenstein and Rabin (2003); Datta and Mullainathan (2014)). 
 
 Among the many dimensions of behavioral economics, two related insights are 
particularly important for the climate change discourse.  First, individuals have two 
systems of cognition and response—“thinking fast and thinking slow”, to paraphrase the 
title of Daniel Kahneman’s hugely popular general book on the subject (Kahneman, 2011). 
The thinking fast part is instinctive and makes quick classifications of signals received in 
order to formulate a response.  This part of behavior is more emotional and short term in 
nature.  The thinking slow part is reflective and longer term in nature. “Hot” and “cool” 
states are one way in which this dichotomy has been characterized.  Another 
characterization is that the individual is in effect made up of two individuals, with the “cool 
state” longer term thinking individual attempting to set the frame for the “hot state” short 
term thinking counterpart.  This is the characterization which allows us to make sense of 
individuals putting restrictions on themselves and their possible future behavior.  Ulysses 
tying himself to the mast to stop him being pulled towards the calls of the sirens is the 
manifestation of this behavior in antiquity, or at least in the literature of antiquity.  But the 
underlying forces of nature are instantly recognizable in their modern guise—from cooling 
off periods in divorce proceedings, through various commitment devices to promote 
savings, to simple statements such as “take those peanuts away from me,” none of which 
would make sense in the rational choice world of text book economics. 
 
 A second way in which behavioral economics can change the way in which choices 
affecting climate change can be conceptualized is its recognition that humans are social 
beings who are hard wired to care about collective outcomes.  Perhaps the most striking 
demonstration of this is an experimental game, played by two individuals, called “the 
ultimatum game” (Alvard, 2004).  There are, say, one hundred dollars on the table.  One 
individual is asked to propose a division of the total between the two.  If the other 
individual accepts, the division stands and the two walk off with their respective shares. 
But if the other individual does not accept, the total sum is lost and neither individual gets 
anything.  The rational choice based outcome would be as follows.  For the second 
individual, any money is better than no money, so he would be willing to accept any 
amount no matter how small.  Knowing this, the first individual proposes only a penny 
(say) for the other, which is accepted and the game is over.  
 
However, when this experiment is run in practice, and it has been run thousands and 
thousands of times in very many settings the world over, this is not the outcome that is 
observed.  The proposed divisions are much closer to 50/50—not quite 50/50, but not 99/1 
either.  Why?  The answer is that a proposal of 99/1 would so offend the second individual 
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that he would walk away rather than accept such a blatantly unequal division.  Knowing 
this, the first individual would not propose it.  This and many other experiments suggest a 
strong inbuilt sense of social justice in individuals when faced with explicit choices which 
test the limits of equitable outcomes. 
 
These two features of behavioral economics, and these are two among manyiv, are 
directly relevant to the role of education in mitigating the market failure that is climate 
change.  The reason there is a market failure is that prices in markets are not reflecting true 
social scarcity, especially taking into account the wellbeing for future generations.  This is 
because it is technically not possible for greenhouse gas emissions to be fully parceled out 
and priced individual by individual (although it is possible to do this to some extent, of 
course), nor is it possible for future generations to express their demand for lower carbon 
emissions in today’s markets.  But what if the consequences of climate change for future 
generations were internalized in the psychology of the present generation?  Then, 
presumably, their demands would reflect these factors and therefore market prices would 
do so as well. 
 
Thus alongside carbon taxation as a tool of climate justice between the generations, 
we now have education as a powerful tool in the arsenal of policy makers.  Building on the 
insight that individuals do have social preferences, but that what is needed is for this long 
term perspective to frame their short run behavior, education at all levels emerges as an 
instrument for mitigating the market failure of climate change.  This ranges from education 
about the consequences of climate change and its causes based on the scientific evidence, 
to “nudging” individual consumers towards changing their consumption patterns and levels 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), and inducing owners and managers of firms to take on board 
climate change as part of social responsibility.  This education can be in the shape of 
formal classes about climate change at school and college, and educational messages 
delivered through social media.  None of this reduces the role of conventional economic 
tools of taxes and subsidies, but as noted earlier these instruments by themselves will not 
be enough.  The new science of behavioral economics provides a powerful platform for 
reshaping education as a tool for addressing the market failure that is climate change. 
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4.  Education and Distributional Failure 
  
Addressing climate change as market failure requires corrective action which 
changes price signals to discourage the types of production and consumption today which 
lead to greenhouse gas emission and temperature increase.  The intervention can address 
prices directly through taxes and subsidies, or indirectly through changing patterns of 
demand and supply through education.  But such corrective action, while it addresses the 
issue of justice between the generations, can have significant and profound effects on 
distributional outcomes within our own generation. 
 
 A clear example is provided by the carbon tax, or any other intervention which 
discourages the production of fossil fuel.  This is good for lowering greenhouse gas 
emissions, but it will lower the income of coal producers, and those who are dependent on 
coal for energy in their economic activity.  More generally, those who are heavily 
dependent on fossil fuel based energy for their development will lose out in the short term 
from any policies which lead to a reduction in fossil fuel usage.  And, depending on the sort 
of adjustment one has in mind, the “short term” could last at least a couple of decades.  It is 
not surprising, then, that countries like India which are heavily coal-dependent for their 
energy needs are wary of the carbon tax argument.  Another example of the knock on 
effects of attempting justice between the generations, on justice within the present 
generation, is that of bio-fuels.  These have been encouraged through subsidies in recent 
years, one justification being that they will substitute for greenhouse emitting fossil fuels. 
However, expansion of crops for bio-fuels reduces land available for food crops, which 
raises their price (Wright, 2014).  This increase benefits producers food crops, some of 
whom will be poor, but it hurts those poor who do not produce food but spend most of their 
income on food for consumption.  Thus use of standard tax-subsidy instruments to “fix” the 
market failure of climate change need not be entirely benign on the poor and the vulnerable 
of the present generation. 
 
 What is the answer to the dilemma of addressing justice between generations 
without intensifying injustice within the present generation?  The answer has to be to seek 
out more policy instruments.  These can be instruments whose distributional effects on 
present generations are not as negative as others.  But, if this is not fully successful, then 
we need instruments which correct the negative present distributional consequences of 
addressing the market failure into the future.  At the most general level, these will have to 
be instruments of compensation, although they need not be literally compensation in the 
form of funds handed over.  
 
For example, resources devoted to research and development on energy efficient 
production, tailored to the needs and circumstances of the poor in poor countries, is not a 
direct transfer. But if the outcome of this research is made freely available, it can help to 
mitigate the effects of carbon taxes for an economy which is heavily dependent on fossil 
fuel energy.  At the same time, accepting that attempts at mitigation of climate change 
through reducing greenhouse gas emissions cannot address the climate change effects 
which are already “baked in” due to past emissions, resources could be devoted to 
adaptation to climate change.  Resources devoted to research and development on 
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managing the consequences of sea level rises, or more frequent and violent typhoons, 
would address injustice in our time if they were devoted to the needs of the poorest.  
 
Consider now the case of direct transfers in the form of development assistance, to 
address the negative knock on effects on the presently vulnerable, of interventions to 
manage climate change.  Straightforwardly, alongside the investments discussed above to 
create resilience against the effects of climate change, there could be direct transfers of 
resources when climate events do occur despite mitigation and adaptation efforts.  Such 
transfers are already discussed as part of a broader discourse on addressing the causes and 
consequences of macro level crises for the poorest of the poor, whether these crises are the 
result of financial contagion, infectious diseases, or climate related events (Kanbur, 2009). 
However, the transfers can also be longer term investments in human capital which lay the 
foundations of growth and development. 
 
A range of such investments are possible and are the staple of discussions on the 
future of development assistance.  However, along with investment in health, education 
usually tops the list of priorities for developing countries.  The reasoning behind this 
prioritization has already been discussed in a previous section.  Inequality in human assets 
is a root cause of income inequality and other types of inequality in society, and 
inequalities in educational achievements are severe in the poorest countries.  It is also at the 
heart of the transmission of inequality across generations, as poorer parents bequeath lower 
educational investment to their children in an ongoing spiral.  Further, educational 
inequality is a key dimension of gender inequality, and mother’s education is a key causal 
determinant of children’s health  (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009, and World Bank, 2011). 
 
There is a continued need for investment in basic education to lay the foundations 
for equitable development.  Education was one of the key Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and will continue to be prominent in the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs).  For poor countries, the short term negative consequences of climate change 
mitigation measures, for example through a carbon tax, would worsen the resource 
constraints.  There seems then to be a natural case for compensation in the form of 
assistance for educational investment. Indeed, such assistance can be part of the “grand 
bargain” between rich and poor countries where the imperative of continued development 
for present generations is recognized at the same time as the imperative of mitigating 
climate change for future generations. 
 
Putting together the poverty alleviation imperative and the key role of investment in 
education in achieving this, with the central role of countries like India in managing 
greenhouse emissions, suggests the contours of the global grand bargain  which can meld 
together justice between the generations and justice within the present generation—justice 
in our time.  But this needs education of the taxpaying publics of the rich countries, on the 
ethics of global redistribution, the science and ethics of climate change and climate justice, 
and of course on the role of education itself in achieving these goals. 
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6. Policy Conclusions 
 Climate justice requires sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its 
resolution equitably and fairly.  It brings together justice between generations and justice 
within generations.  In particular it requires that attempts to address justice between 
generations through various interventions designed to curb greenhouse emissions today, do 
not end up creating injustice in our time by hurting the presently poor and vulnerable.  The 
spillover effects from addressing climate change to the wellbeing of present generations 
can in turn be addressed in principle if there a sufficient number and variety of policy 
instruments.  The smaller the set of policy instruments, the more likely it is that injustice 
within the present generation cannot be avoided.  This essay has considered the 
transformative role of education in its many dimensions as one entry point into expanding 
the scope of policy instruments available to policy makers. 
 
 The first use of education flows from the recent literature on behavioral economics. 
Education, at different levels and in different manifestations, which conveys full scientific 
information about the likely consequences of climate change, and which builds on the 
natural tendency in human beings to be aware of the collective good, can change individual 
demand and supply in the market place in a climate friendly direction as much as any 
conventional tax or subsidy scheme.  Indeed, such shifts in demand and supply can be 
affected even when, for technical or political reasons, tax and subsidy schemes are not 
feasible.  Such education can even help to overcome the traditional political opposition to 
carbon tax proposals in rich countries, as their populations become more aware of the costs 
of climate change.  The education can be of a conventional type, through the school and 
college curriculum, or more general and widespread, using new technology and social 
media.  But the overall effect is bound to be beneficial by in effect creating new policy 
instruments to address the market failure that is climate change. 
 
 However, even with such use of education to enhance policy responses to the 
injustice between the generations, the issue of injustice within our generation is unlikely to 
disappear, far from it.  Carbon taxes or bio-fuel subsidies, for example, will indeed have 
distributional consequences for our generation, and addressing this will require resource 
transfers within our generation to maintain and enhance the development potential of those 
negatively affected by interventions to mitigate climate change.  Once again, education, in 
the form of development assistance for education in particular, comes to the fore. 
Continued assistance for education to the poor in Low and in Middle Income Countries, as 
part of a grand global bargain on climate change and development, is thus an invaluable 
instrument for climate justice. 
 
 To conclude, education can change market place behavior, primarily in rich 
countries but also in poor countries, and thus help mitigate climate injustice between the 
generations; and resources targeted to education of the poorest can help their development 
but also help to counter some of the negative spillover effects of climate change mitigation 
interventions.  Hence the title of this essay—Education for Climate Justice. 
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i This is related, in macroeconomics, to the Tinbergen Principle, after the Nobel Prize winning economist Jan 
Tinbergen. 
ii In economics these are known as Pigouvian taxes, after the British economist of the early twentieth century, 
Arthur Pigou. 
iii The Clark Medal is the award given annually by the American Economic Association for the best American 
economist under the age of 40.  
iv For a fuller range of insights from behavioral economics, see Camerer, Lowenstein and Rabin (2003) 
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